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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the following matter: ‘’Current Problems and Recent 
Developments in Investment Arbitration’’. This thesis seeks to explore and analyze 
the various existing problems, which characterize the investment arbitration, as an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The following lines, particularly summarize 
and record the recent developments that have arisen in investment arbitration in 
parallel with the references to the problems that may still consist controversial issues. 
The introduction of this dissertation refers to what internationally has been established 
as investment arbitration and in what ways, fundamental or not, that kind differs from 
commercial arbitration. At the same part of the text, it is analyzed whether investment 
arbitration as a mechanism satisfy the applicants and if yes, why still parties hesitate 
to betake this alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 
Concerning the main issues of this thesis, they contain a number of problems that 
have arisen throughout the years, since the function of the institution, as well as recent 
developments, many of which constitute answers in many questions regarding the 
ISDS mechanism. The matters that are mentioned are the third-party participation 
(amicus curiae) in the investment arbitration procedures, what constitutes an 
investment (definition of the investment), the litigation before domestic courts and the 
level that it functions as a precondition for international arbitration. This part also 
involves the connection between EU law and the investment arbitration, the indirect 
expropriation in investment arbitration, the provisional measures and the role of 
previous decisions in investment arbitration procedures. This part ends by a reference 
to the possibility of an appeals mechanism in investment arbitration, the advantages 
and the disadvantages of its adoption. 
To conclude this thesis, there is a long reference to the various concerns about the 
whole mechanism and more specifically to the concerns about the legitimacy and 
transparency of the decisions, the concerns about arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality and the concerns regarding the costs and time-intensity of arbitrations. At 
this part, there are mentioned a few proposals for the improvement of the ISDS 
mechanism and in the end are demonstrated the concluding remarks. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to inform the readers about the necessity of the 
improvement of the function of the investment arbitration mechanism by analyzing 
the current problems and the recent developments of this kind of arbitration. 
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Current Problems and Recent Developments in Investment Arbitration 
The present thesis is about ‘’current problems and recent developments in investment 
arbitration’’. It begins with a definition of investment arbitration (see A). In a second 
step, the differences between investment arbitration and commercial arbitration will 
be explored (see B.) and thereafter as part of the main issues of the present thesis there 
will be analyzed various matters. 
 
 
Introduction 
A.What has been established internationally as investment arbitration and in 
what ways, fundamental or not, that kind differs from commercial arbitration. 
• Definition of investment arbitration 
In the next lines, in order the definition of investment arbitration to be clear, it will be 
given that this mechanism is a form of resolving disputes arising out of an investment, 
where the participants are investors on the one hand and host States on the other. The 
substantive legal basis for function of the mechanism can be found in treaties like 
CAFTA, NAFTA and ECT and the main protections are clauses like FET and MFN. 
Apart from treaty disputes, investment arbitrations may also concern mere contractual 
disputes. In conclusion, it will be mentioned that the procedural framework includes 
institutional and ad hoc arbitration, where the main institutions are ICSID, ICC etc 
and the ad hoc rules lead to the UNCITRATL ones. All these matters will be analyzed 
in the next lines. 
Arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution is constantly evolving and 
updated getting in line with the developments and the international market needs. 
More specifically, investment arbitration, the seeds of which kind of arbitration were 
planted many years ago, presents continuous rise. Taking also into account that the 
world’s first BIT was signed on November 25, 1959 between Pakistan and Germany, 
after has been tested as a reliable pillar of arbitration, someone can imagine the 
evolution of the mechanism up to nowadays. Before proceeding to specific details, it’s 
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necessary to clarify the definition of investment arbitration and its differences from 
commercial arbitration.  
Investment arbitration occurs in the event of an investment dispute, which dispute can 
arise between a private company or an individual when they invest in a foreign 
country and the host State or a State owned company, where it matters whether the 
conduct is attributable to the State. As international commerce and foreign investment 
have proliferated, so too have disputes between private entities and sovereign 
governments, their regional or local authorities, or State-owned companies. Resolving 
these disputes, whether arising under contracts or from administrative or regulatory 
action by the foreign State, can be particularly complex.1 According to many State 
contracts there is reference to litigation of investment disputes in the national courts of 
the host State and of course this could raise serious concerns about the neutrality and 
fairness of local court proceedings. These concerns are growing as even if the award 
is in the investor’s favor, local courts can sometimes prevent enforcement against 
overseas assets by granting annulment under local law. 
Summarizing, it can be observed that the disputing parties of an investment arbitration 
can be, on the one hand individuals or private companies investing their money in a 
foreign country, the host state, and on the other hand the host State or a State owned 
company, both claiming their rights. 
When investment arbitration is mentioned, both arbitrations under treaties and 
arbitration under contracts are included, in both cases, agreements that provide 
companies and individuals with special rights and legal protections when they invest 
in a foreign country. 
Foreign investors can sometimes avoid these risks by throwing on bilateral or 
multilateral treaties rather than contract, as the consent to arbitrate may be contained 
in various sources, like in (a) an investment bilateral treaty (BIT), (b) according to the 
host State’s national investment law or (c) in an investment agreement. BITs are 
created to promote investments in a country, by protecting on equal terms the 
investors, companies and individuals, when they invest in a foreign country, the host 
State, and by providing special rights and legal protections to them. 
                                                                                                                          
1 Jean Kalicki, ‘’Arbitration with Sovereigns and State-Owned Entities’’. 
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A bilateral investment treaty can provide protection to the investor in a foreign State if 
there is such a BIT between the two States. Typically, BITs provide for the following 
standards of protection of an investor: a)most favored nation treatment (MFN 
treatment), according to which the beneficiary State will be granted all the 
competitive advantages that any other nation also receives, namely the beneficiary 
foreign investor will be treated no worse than any other foreign investor, b) according 
to the national treatment, foreign investors and the nationals enjoy the same 
competitive opportunities and there is no negative differentiation between them, c) 
FET treatment , the most frequently invoked standard in investment disputes, imposes 
host States to maintain stable and predictable the legal environment for the foreign 
investors. Additionally, standards such as protection from expropriation2, freedom to 
transfer means and funds and full protection and security, indicate that there is a 
plethora of protective clauses. 
It would be useful to mention the Institutions under which the investment disputes are 
usually settled and the different kind of rules that could apply in order these disputes 
to be resolved. Therefore, concerning the settlement of investment disputes, there is 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an 
autonomous international institution established under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States with 
over one hundred and forty member States3, as well as the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), which is one of the most important and 
frequently used arbitration institutions worldwide, after ICSID which is the most 
important for investment arbitrations. 
 Apart from these institutions, the UNCITRAL arbitration Rules are widely used in ad 
hoc arbitrations as well as administered arbitrations and cover all aspects of the 
arbitral process, providing a model arbitration clause, setting out procedural rules 
regarding the appointment of arbitrators and the conduct of arbitral proceedings, and 
establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the award. The 
original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were adopted in 1976 and have been used for 
                                                                                                                          
2 Professor Ole Kristian Fauchald and Kjersti Schiotz Thorud, ‘’Protection of 
investors against expropriation- Norway’s obligations under investment treaties’’ 
Luis Paradell, ‘’ Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment’’, 
Kluwer  Law International 2009, p. 376 
3https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp 
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the settlement of a broad range of disputes, including disputes between private 
commercial parties where no arbitral institution is involved, investor-State disputes, 
State-to-State disputes and commercial disputes administered by arbitral institutions.4 
Obviously, in addition to these the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ‘’offers 
a forum for businesses and other organizations to examine and better comprehend the 
nature and significance of the major shifts taking place in the world economy by 
providing investment arbitration services, the consensual process for resolving 
business disputes in a binding, enforceable manner.’’5 
As treaty-based investment arbitration is becoming increasingly important in 
international commerce, the Energy Charter Treaty occupies a singular position, 
providing a unique multilateral investment protection regime for the energy sector. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have also been prepared for this purpose, namely the 
settlement of investment disputes and therefore, chapter eleven of the NAFTA and 
chapter ten of the CAFTA contain provisions designed to protect cross-border 
investors and facilitate the settlement of investment disputes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
4 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.ht
ml 
 
5http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/ 
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• Investment VS Commercial arbitration: 
In the following, the differences between investment arbitration and commercial 
arbitration will be explored. It will be submitted that although, both procedures are 
relevant to the same alternative dispute resolution mechanism, there are standards 
which dissociate them. 
Factors such as the legal culture, the legal framework and the applicable law, the 
jurisdiction, the predictability and consistency of decisions, as well as the 
confidentiality in parallel with the transparency lead to the separation of the two kinds 
of arbitration, as they constitute distinctive features. It would be helpful a brief 
reference to each of these factors in order the differences to become more 
understandable with emphasis on the dilemma, confidentiality or transparency. 
With relevance to the legal culture and the impact that it has on each of the two kinds 
of arbitration, it’s necessary to say that the different political backgrounds and the 
divergence in ethical standards of each country have a huge influence on the 
formation of the legal culture of that country· Although the most obvious 
differentiation is between common law systems and civil law systems, still minor 
culture differences can affect the whole mechanism. According to article 21.2 of the 
ICC Rules ‘’The arbitral tribunal shall take account of the provisions of the contract, 
if any, between the parties and of any relevant trade usages’’, which trade usages can 
be different between various regions of the world· and so in commercial arbitration, 
different legal cultures become relevant. On the other hand, in investment arbitration, 
where the involvement of governments and other State institutions is intense, these 
culture differences can also affect the procedures, especially when concepts such as 
democracy or dictatorial systems are perceived differently. However, when we refer 
to treaty based arbitration, it is indeed obvious that international law plays a greater 
role. 
Another difference between commercial and investment arbitration are the legal 
frameworks in which they function. 
Regarding the public international law, in commercial arbitration the only relevant 
treaty today is the New York Convention, which deals with the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, while in investment arbitration there is a 
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plethora of BITs and also multilateral instruments, like ICSID Convention and the 
Energy Charter Treaty and also regional instruments, as NAFTA and CAFTA. 
Concerning the national law, in commercial arbitration, procedurally, the mandatory 
provisions of national law rule the arbitration at the place of arbitration and usually 
the tribunal has to apply the national substantive law. On the other hand, in 
investment arbitration, the mandatory provisions of the national law play a role, if 
treaties such as ICSID or NAFTA don’t apply, namely when rules of institutions such 
as the ICC or the LCIA are chosen to be applied, which in turn, have to respect the 
mandatory provisions of the place of arbitration. 
In order this difference to be more conceivable, a distinction has to be made between 
the applicable substantive law and the procedural law. As regards procedural law,  
ICSID is an autonomous system independent from any domestic arbitration law. 
ICSID is also one arbitral institution foreseen under NAFTA – in this case there is 
hence no domestic arbitration law to be considered. However, NAFTA also refers to 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In this case, mandatory provisions at the place of 
arbitration apply. As regards substantive law, public international law plays a great 
role and may «trump» domestic law. However, it would be wrong to conclude that 
domestic law plays no role at all (e.g. for the question whether a property right has 
come into existence).  
Concerning the jurisdictional differences, in investment arbitration are much frequent, 
because in commercial arbitration ‘’they mostly concern the scope of the contractual 
arbitration clause, particularly whether it covers also non-signatories within a group of 
companies or behind a general contractor or after an assignment of the contract’’.6 On 
the other hand, in investment treaty cases, the question of who should bear the 
burden of proof on the jurisdictional phase of investment arbitration and what 
is the standard of review of facts and legal allegations presented by a claimant i s  
o f t en  a ro sen .  In investment arbitration respondents' usual jurisdictional objections 
contest the issues of nationality of investor, existence of investment or 
claims to be outside the subject-matter jurisdiction. For testing claimant's 
                                                                                                                          
6 Karl-Heinz Boeckstiegel, ‘’Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How different 
are they today?’’, The journal of the London Court of International Arbitration, 
Volume 28 issue 4 2012, p.583. 
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claims for jurisdictional purposes, investment tribunals have adopted the so-called 
prima-facie test.7 
Predictability and consistency of decisions are directly connected to the issue of 
transparency, so they will be analyzed together. 
In commercial arbitration and more generally we would say that, the principle of 
confidentiality is considered as one of the most fundamental principles of arbitration 
and usually is the most important and decisive reason for the parties to choose the 
arbitral proceedings as the alternative mechanism for the resolution of their dispute.8 
A former Secretary General of the ICC has said that confidentiality was regularly 
cited by parties as the most attractive feature of arbitration as compared with litigation 
and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Theoretically, the privacy and the confidentiality that characterize the arbitral 
mechanism lead business secrets and personal confidences of the parties, as well as 
the proceedings themselves, the associated documents and the final arbitral award to 
be kept confidential. However, because of the lack of a uniform legislation, the 
legislative regime differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and the parties should not 
assume that all jurisdictions would recognize an implied commitment to 
confidentiality. 
Constantly arise concerns above the principle of confidentiality, taking into account 
that while on the one hand, according to the freedom of contract, parties shouldn’t be 
restricted by disclosure rules in negotiating, performing or terminating agreements, on 
the other hand, sometimes there are reasons that necessitate the disclosure of some 
information. Apart from this, there is always the need for transparent decision-
making, but also the need business secrets or issues on States interests to be kept 
confidential. 
                                                                                                                          
7 Josef Ostřanský, ‘’The burden of proof and the prima facie threshold at the 
jurisdictional stage in investment treaty arbitration’’, Academic Year 2011-2012, 
Tutorial Group C 
8 Anjanette H. Raymond, ‘’Confidentiality in a forum of last resort: is the use of 
confidential arbitration a good idea for business and society?’’, Lexis Nexis 
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Of particular importance is the decision of the High Court of Australia in Esso v. 
Plowman case9, because according to this decision, ‘’ Confidentiality is not an 
essential attribute of private arbitration, whether on the grounds of long-standing 
arbitral custom and practice, or in order to give efficacy to the private nature of 
arbitral proceedings’’, and also ‘’if there were a duty of confidentiality, it could be 
curtailed in the public interest’’. 
On the other hand, concerning the arbitration for the settlement of investment 
disputes, the concerns multiply, as such proceedings usually deal with public interests 
and the consideration of confidentiality as a discretionary right and not as an 
obligation, magnifies the doubt whether investor-state arbitral proceedings have to be 
treated as confidential or not. 
In recent investment arbitrations, transparency has gained much importance. 
Transparency can be achieved through disclosure of decisions and pleadings to the 
public, as well as by granting certain participatory rights to non-disputing parties. 
Investment arbitration proceedings usually concern sensitive questions of public 
interest, examining for example the lawfulness of regulatory and administrative 
actions of a State and in general matters that could have major economic and political 
consequences· that’s why in investment arbitration, the principles of confidentiality 
and necessary transparency collide. 
In contrast with the traditional commercial arbitration, where the confidentiality of the 
process and the contractual relationship, and a tailor-made solution play an important 
role, in investment arbitration there is a strong desire for transparency and disclosure, 
although the recent UNCITRAL Transparency Rules foresee exceptions from 
transparency.10 Because of the involvement of States, it is supported that it would be 
helpful even the anonymous publication of arbitral awards on investment disputes in 
order a uniform development of case law to be achieved in this area. It would be 
useful to be mentioned   article 29§§2,4 of the 2012 US Model BIT by the title of 
‘’Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings’’ according to which: 
                                                                                                                          
9 http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12223892932650/confidentiality_chapter_for_leading_arbs__guide.
pdf, p. 420-427 
10 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-
release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-Transparency.pdf, article 7 
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Article 29§2 
 2. The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and shall determine, in 
consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements. 
However, any disputing party that intends to use information designated as protected 
information in a hearing shall so advise the tribunal. The tribunal shall make 
appropriate arrangements to protect the information from disclosure.  
  
Article 29§4 
 4. Any protected information that is submitted to the tribunal shall be protected from 
disclosure in accordance with the following procedures:  
 (a) Subject to subparagraph (d), neither the disputing parties nor the tribunal shall 
disclose to the non-disputing Party or to the public any protected information where 
the disputing party that provided the information clearly designates it in accordance 
with subparagraph (b);  
 (b) Any disputing party claiming that certain information constitutes protected  
information shall clearly designate the information at the time it is submitted to  
the tribunal;  
 (c) A disputing party shall, at the time it submits a document containing information 
claimed to be protected information, submit a redacted version of the document that 
does not contain the information. Only the redacted version shall be provided to the 
non-disputing Party and made public in accordance with paragraph 1; and  
 (d) The tribunal shall decide any objection regarding the designation of information 
claimed to be protected information. If the tribunal determines that such information 
was not properly designated, the disputing party that submitted the information may 
(i) withdraw all or part of its submission containing such information, or (ii) agree to 
resubmit complete and redacted documents with corrected designations in accordance 
with the tribunal’s determination and subparagraph (c). In either case, the other 
disputing party shall, whenever necessary, resubmit complete and redacted documents 
which either remove the information withdrawn under (i) by the disputing party that 
       Current  Problems  and  Recent  Developments  in  Investment  Arbitration                 xv  
  
first submitted the information or redesignate the information consistent with the 
designation under (ii) of the disputing party that first submitted the information. 
Other examples can be found in the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA and the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT, which address transparency expressly and in detail.11 A similar trend can 
be observed in the DSU negotiations at the WTO where various transparency 
provisions have been advanced by State Parties.12 
 It is still suggested an adaptation of the general principle of confidentiality in 
investment arbitration, because of the particularities of investor-state disputes and in 
order to be reflected the unique needs of international investment arbitration, although 
confidentiality is by no longer the default rule, according to UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules or the ICSID Rules. The adjudication of State actions in these 
kind of disputes and the further economic and political importance that could this 
adjudication have, impose the need for the development of case law in this area 
making the transparency unavoidable. Only through the public availability of 
decisions will lawyers and arbitrators be able to produce fair results and promote 
consistent development of the law.  
Furthermore, an arbitral award concerning hypothetically the lawfulness of the actions 
of a State and the legal protection it might can offer to its investors has not only 
unilateral and specific impacts on these notably interested parties, but it could also 
affect other foreign investors who might be interested in investing on the ground of 
this state. And this fact also impels to a more transparent system. Apart from this, 
there are also other reasons which create the necessity for a more transparent system. 
Public interests are usually involved in investment arbitration, the awards may lead to 
substantial liability of States for which the taxpayers have to come up and also States 
may have human rights obligations to promote transparency. 
                                                                                                                          
11 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, November 2004, arts. 28-37 available at  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file8
47_6897.pdf; See  also, Canada's Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion 
Agreement Model, 2003, arts. 20-47 available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf 
12 Meg Kinnear, General Counsel, Trade Law Bureau, Departments of Justice &  
International Trade Canada, ‘’ Transparency and Third Party Participation  
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’’, Symposium Co-organised by ICSID, OECD 
and UNCTAD,p.2 
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B.Does investment arbitration, as a mechanism, satisfy the applicants and if yes, 
why still parties hesitate to betake this alternative dispute resolution mechanism? 
Although it is doubtless that investment arbitration during the last years gains much 
support as an institution, is also true that, constantly appear in the limelight various 
unpromising reasons for the whole procedure. 
Two events of the last years, relevant to the withdrawal from ICSID Convention are 
remarkable, that of Ecuador’s in 200913 following Bolivia, which withdrew from 
ICSID in 2007 and that of Venezuela’s in 2012. Undoubtedly, the basic reason for this 
move is the perception in many Latin America countries that international investment 
arbitration is biased towards investors and this results to the lack of confidence in the 
institution because of the legal uncertainty. The loss of faith in the system raises 
questions about the Convention’s achievement of its purpose. However, political 
reasons and political interests are not excluded. 
More specifically, concerning Ecuador’s tactic, President Rafael Correa had expressed 
a totally negative and aggressive position towards foreign companies operating in 
certain business sectors in Ecuador, including oil and mining firms. Subsequently, in 
March 2008, President Correa announced that Ecuador would withdraw from a 
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that it had entered into with other 
developing states, including El Salvador and Paraguay. More recently, he threatened 
to expel from Ecuador any foreign companies that initiated arbitration proceedings 
against the state. In addition to this, Ecuador has supported the formation of an 
alternative forum of investment arbitration, to be based in South America.14 
 
 
On the other hand and concerning the Venezuela’s regime, there is also a political 
background, which however affects the investment arbitration of the country. 
                                                                                                                          
13 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=O
penPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=
Announcement20 
14 Joshua M. Robbins, ‘’Ecuador withdraws from ICSID Convention’’, p.1, 
uk.practicallaw.com 
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According to the Foreign Ministry’s 2012 press-release, the country acceded to the 
Convention in 1993 by ‘’ a decision of a provisional and weak government, devoid of 
popular legitimacy and under the pressure of transnational economic sectors involved 
in the dismantling of Venezuela’s national sovereignty’’.15 The denouncement of the 
Convention reveals the government’s political message that there is no trust to the 
system, that the country disavows it and refuses to cooperate with it in the future 
regaining the role of the State in the economy and its State sovereignty. 
 
However, whatever the real reasons for these withdrawals are, the point is that the 
investment arbitration, as an alternative mechanism has not gained the necessary trust 
of the parties, especially in these Latin America countries, which hesitate to choose it, 
because of the legal uncertainty they receive. Taking into consideration, the political 
and economic interests that characterize such investments and therefore how these can 
be influenced by an arbitration mechanism and also the fact that Brazil, one of the 
world’s largest industrial powers, is not party to any bilateral investment treaties and 
hasn’t ratified the ICSID Convention, real doubts and questionings above the 
investment arbitration seem obvious. 
 
Unfortunately, not only in Latin America, but also throughout Europe there are a lot 
of concerns above the success or not of the investment arbitration function, where 
disputes arise. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
exclusive competence on foreign direct investment has shifted from Member States to 
the European level. Since then, have arisen many practical and legal issues in the 
investment treaty field. Doubts concerning the protection of the investors as well as 
the existing and the restructured investments, concerning the applicable law, both in 
terms of selection of a legal system as well as the characterization of the question 
itself, and doubts relevant to the transparency of proceedings in particular with respect 
to the substance and the procedure are some of the reasons of parties’ hesitance 
towards the investment arbitration. 
                                                                                                                          
15  “Gobierno Bolivariano denuncia convenio con Ciadi”, 25 January 2012, 
http://www.mre.gov.ve/ 
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In contrast with what was referred above, in Europe the nature of problems seems 
different, although the result is the same. According to recent trends16, the differences 
in recognition and enforcement regimes under ICSID and non-ICSID arbitrations as 
well as the ineffectiveness17 of the annulment of the awards provisions and the 
recommended appeal mechanism in conjunction with was mentioned before, lead to 
the depreciation of the mechanism even in the European area. 
 
Main issues 
Taking all the above as a starting point, the following section will explore in greater 
detail the procedural and substantive challenges that the system of international 
investment protection is currently facing. A focus will be set on various initiatives to 
enhance the level of transparency, e.g. by third party participation. 
A.Because of all these concerns about the investment arbitration mechanism, it 
has been suggested a modification of the institution in general concerning both 
the procedural section and the merit issues. More specifically, there have been 
many discussions about the nature of third-party participation in investment 
arbitration, namely about the amicus curiae. 
Up to date, and taking into account the implications, positive and negative, of recent 
trends in amicus curiae participation, arbitrators show greater willingness to provide 
third parties with a limited mandate to participate in the arbitral proceedings. Non-
disputing parties have sought to participate in investment proceedings in various 
ways: a) by submitting written amicus briefs on the merits, b) by seeking access to the 
records of the proceedings and c) by taking part in oral proceedings or attending 
hearings as observers. 
The participation of non-disputing parties appeared in the NAFTA context18, under 
the Methanex case, where at the end the Methanex tribunal found it had the authority 
                                                                                                                          
16 Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues note, 
UNCTAD 28-29 May 2013, p.10 
17 Lise Johnson, ‘’ Annulment of ICSID Awards: Recent developments’’, IV Annual 
Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers New 
Delhi, October 27-29, 2010, p.1. 
18 NAFTA Chapter 11, article 1120(1)(c). 
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to accept amicus curiae submissions under the discretion granted by article 15 of 
UNCITRAL Rules19, according to which: ‘’Subject to these Rules, the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, 
provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the 
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case’’. 
Many cases followed, such as the UPS v Canada20, again under the NAFTA 
arbitration tribunal, the Tunari v Bolivia case21, in ICSID arbitration proceedings, the 
Vivendi v Argentina case22, where the tribunal was faced with a number of relevant 
petitions. 
In April 2006, the ICSID Rules were amended and now in article 37(2) is provided 
the concept under which the non-disputing parties are allowed to file written 
submissions· discussions also took place on the occasion of the revision of 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules concerning the amicus curiae participation through the 
draft article 15(5), although at the end this proposal was not incorporated into the new 
version of the UNCITRAL Rules as pre-released on 12 June 2010. 
In summary, there is now a solid foundation for the acceptance of amici curiae 
submissions under specific circumstances in NAFTA/UNCITRAL and ICSID 
arbitrations and can participate as amici curiae workers unions, nongovernmental 
organizations and business federations, and after the amendment of the ICSID Rules 
and the FTC Statement, the stabilization of such participation is more possible.23 
In general, amicus curiae intervention has been permitted in investment treaty 
arbitrations on the basis that: a) such arbitration proceedings have concerned issues of 
public interest, b) such intervention can assist the tribunal with special expertise and 
                                                                                                                          
19  Methanex, decision of the Tribunal on petitions from third persons to intervene as 
amici curiae of 15 January 2001, paras 47 and 53. 
20 UPS, Decision on petitions for intervention and participation as amici curiae of 17 
October 2001. 
21 Aguas del Tunari SA v.Republic of Bolivia, (Tunari), ICSID Case no ARB/02/3. 
22 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v 
Argentine Republic, (Vivendi), ICSID Case no ARB/03/19. 
23http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/NAFTA_Commi
ssion/Section_Index.html 
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c) the tribunal process could benefit from being perceived as more open or 
transparent.24 
The amicus involvement has been supported as a positive innovation of the 
investment arbitration procedure, as it is meant to contribute to the procedural 
legitimacy of the arbitral process as well as to the substantive quality of the awards. 
Such participation can contribute to the procedural openness and can ensure that the 
broader public doesn’t keep the arbitration process secretive. The legal quality of the 
award can be improved and the international investment law as a whole can be 
developed systemically. Apart from this, representatives of supranational regimes, 
such as the Commission, could prevent the fragmentation of international law. 
However, taking into account the possible practical burdens on the disputing parties, 
like costs and delays and the fact that confidentiality and privacy can be lost because 
of the third-party participation and the corollary of potential politicization, the 
investor confidence in the investment arbitration mechanism can be even less. 
A solution would be the development of formalized criteria for third-party 
participation. Concerning these criteria, ICSID Rules, the FTC Statement and the 
Canadian Model BIT focus on the potential of the amicus brief to assist the tribunal, 
in case that it would address a matter within the scope of the dispute and in case that  
the third party has a ‘significant’ interest in the proceedings.25 In addition to this, a 
clear guideline in the rules utilized in investment arbitration and the allowance of 
different forms of amicus participation could minor the hesitance towards it. 
Up to date, it is obvious that cannot be addressed the interplay between the issues of 
the need of transparency and openness to non-disputing participants on the one hand 
and the potential of being less attractive the arbitration to investors if amicus briefs 
become widespread.  
 
                                                                                                                          
24 Methanex, Decision of the tribunal o petitions from third persons to intervene as 
amici curiae of 15 January 2001, para 49. 
25 See FTC Statement, supra note 64, ICSID Rules, supra note 17, art. 37(2), Canadian 
Model BIT, supra note 65, art. 39. 
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Although many of the current problems and recent developments in investment 
arbitration have already been mentioned above, it is necessary to be explored 
further subjects of interest relevant to the recent trends in international 
investment law. In the next lines there will be reported new sections and will be 
analyzed in further details already stated matters.  
 
B.Definition of Investment 
Primarily, it will be given the definition of investment according to the latest 
decisions. So, concerning the definition of investment, a definition which is necessary 
to be established jurisdiction under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, decisions 
rendered in 2012 seem to focus principally on three factors: contribution, risk and 
duration. For example, the tribunal in Electrabel v. Hungary noted that “while there is 
incomplete unanimity between tribunals regarding the elements of an investment, 
there is a general consensus that the three objective criteria of (i) a contribution, (ii) a 
certain duration, and (iii) an element of risk are necessary elements of an investment.” 
The tribunal also noted that, while the economic development of the host State was 
one of the objectives of the ICSID Convention (and a desirable consequence of the 
investment), it was “not necessarily an element of an investment’’.26  
 
 
C.The litigation before domestic courts as a precondition for international 
arbitration. 
 
Thereafter, it will be analyzed the litigation before domestic courts as a precondition 
for international arbitration. According to recent cases like the ICS Inspection v. 
Argentina case and  the Georgia v. Russia case, has been clearly favored the strict 
application of procedural prerequisites, such as the 18-month recourse-to-local-courts 
requirement provided for in article 8 of the Argentina-UK BIT irrespective of the 
potential futility or inefficiency of the litigation. Moreover, the tribunal held that ‘’it 
couldn’t create  
                                                                                                                          
26 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, para. 5.43. 
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exceptions to treaty rules where these are merely based upon an assessment of the 
wisdom of the policy in question, having no basis in either the treaty text or in any 
supplementary interpretive source, however desirable such policy considerations 
might be seen to be in the abstract.”27 
 
Similarly, in Daimler v. Argentina, the tribunal based on Article 10 of the Argentina- 
Germany BIT, held that “since the 18-month domestic courts provision constitutes a 
treaty-based pre-condition to the Host State’s consent to arbitrate, it cannot be 
bypassed or otherwise waived by the Tribunal as a mere procedural or admissibility-
related matter”.28 
 
D. EU law and its’ connection with the institution of investment arbitration. 
 
As already mentioned above, in Europe there are still doubts about the effectiveness 
of the arbitration mechanism, with some more specific matters such as the ones that 
have been stated above. 
 
Characteristic of the problematic function of investment arbitration in EU, although 
this decision is particularly relevant as concerns the hierarchy between EU law and 
the ECT,  is the case of Electrabel v. Hungary, where the tribunal rejected the 
Commission’s submissions as a non-disputing party. More specifically, although the 
tribunal recognized the role of EU law as a body of supranational law and the role of 
the Court of Justice of the EU as the arbiter and gate-keeper of EU law and pointed 
out its obligation to apply EU law to the dispute, it however stated that it was not 
required to adjudicate upon the validity of EU law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
27ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited (United Kingdom) v. The Republic of 
Argentina (UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-9),  
Award on Jurisdiction, 10 February 2012 , paras. 267-269 
28 Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/1), Award, 22 August 2012, para 194. Both the ICS Inspection and the 
Daimler tribunals were chaired by Professor Pierre Marie Dupuy. 
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E. Indirect Expropriation in Recent Investment Arbitration 
 
Protection of foreign investors against expropriation is one of the core issues of 
investment law. The large majority of investment tribunals are confronted with 
investors claiming that they or their investment had been expropriated by the host 
government or one of its agencies. Since there is no definition of what constitutes 
indirect expropriation the scope and meaning of this notion has to be determined 
through arbitral practice. Tribunals have developed certain criteria which they apply 
in order to determine whether an expropriation qualifies as indirect at the expense of 
investors.29 
 
 
 
Amicus Curiae (a short reference) 
-The issue of the third party participation (amicus curiae) has already been 
mentioned above, with reference both to its admission as a positive innovation of the 
investment arbitration procedure, but also with reference to its conception as an 
additional practical burden on the disputing parties, concerning the costs and the 
delays and as a blocking agent of confidentiality and privacy during the arbitral 
proceedings. For confirmation of the above, are sited the Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe and 
the Border Timbers v. Zimbabwe cases, where the tribunal rejected the amicus curiae 
brief because the criteria under Rule 37(2) ICSID Arbitration Rules were not satisfied. 
More specifically, the tribunal noted inter alia that (i) the circumstances of the 
amici’s application gave rise to legitimate doubts as to their independence or 
neutrality30 (ii) consideration  of rights of indigenous people under international law 
to which the amicus brief referred, was not part of the tribunal’s mandate under 
                                                                                                                          
29 OECD (2004), “"Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in 
International Investment Law”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 
2004/04, OECD Publishing, p.9 
30 Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and 
Border Timbers Limited et al v. Zimbabwe (ICSID CASE No. ARB/10/25), 
Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012, para. 56. 
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either the ICSID Convention or the applicable BITs31 and (iii) in light of its mission 
and expertise, the ECCHR did not have a “significant interest in the proceeding”32. 
 Apart from this innovation, there are some additional issues that it would be useful to 
be mentioned as they occupied the decisions of the tribunals during the last years and 
constitute recent developments in investment arbitration. 
 
F.Provisional measures in investment arbitration procedures 
One of the issues of great interest and importance in international arbitration in 
general and in investment arbitration specifically is the issue of provisional measures. 
The importance of this question lies in the fact that the terminology with respect to 
interim and partial awards as well as interim awards or measures is confusing and this 
affects the tribunal’s order or not of the provisional measures. 
There is lack of uniformity in the doctrine and practice of international arbitration as 
regards the criteria for delimitation of the different categories of awards. Moreover, 
terms such as “partial award” and “interim award” are used as synonymous without 
attributing to them a particular meaning. Interim measures and even rulings on purely 
procedural matters are named “awards”. 33The ICC Commission on International 
Arbitration attempted to agree on a definition of the different terms, but “… [n]ot only 
did it find that in practice these terms are used often indiscriminately, but it was 
unable to reach a consensus with regard to the definition of an award, despite the fact 
that this is essential for determining which decisions have to be submitted to the ICC 
Court of Arbitration for scrutiny…”.34 
                                                                                                                          
31 Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and 
Border Timbers Limited et al v. Zimbabwe (ICSID CASE No. ARB/10/25), 
Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012, para. 59. 
32 Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and 
Border Timbers Limited et al v. Zimbabwe (ICSID CASE No. ARB/10/25), 
Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012, para 61. 
33 Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, ‘’ The Relationship Between Interim and Final Awards - 
Res Judicata Concerns’’, p. 246, Kluwer database 
34 Jean-Francois POUDRET and Sebastien BESSON, Comparative Law of 
International Arbitration, p. 635. For the discussion on the ICC Commission on 
terminology, see ICC, “Final Report on Interim and Partial Awards of a Working 
       Current  Problems  and  Recent  Developments  in  Investment  Arbitration                 xxv  
  
Interim is defined as: “… for, during, belonging to, or connected with an intervening 
period of time; temporary, provisional”. This definition includes two possibilities, 
which are used interchangeably but have different meanings. First, interim may be 
read as belonging to or connected to the intervening period of the dispute. In this 
sense, interim would be understood in temporal relationship to final award. The 
intervening period may be thought of as anything that occurs between the formation 
of the tribunal and the end of the proceedings. An interim award may be defined as 
any award disposing of an issue that precedes the final award (or any award putting an 
end to the dispute). In sum, it is a fully reasoned award that resolves an 
issue connected with an intervening period, as opposed to the end of the dispute. 
Second, interim means temporary or provisional. Under this reading, an interim award 
may be thought of as a temporary or provisional award. 35 
In line with past practice, the tribunals in recent cases have concluded that provisional 
measures may be ordered where the situation is urgent and the requested measures are 
necessary to preserve the asserted right from irreparable harm and a characteristic 
example is the Tethyan v. Pakistan case.36 
Another relevant example is the Burlington v. Ecuador case, where the tribunal 
rejected the claimant’s argument that the non compliance with an order for 
provisional remedies constituted expropriation of the claimant’s right to pursue ICSID 
arbitration. While the tribunal did not excuse the respondent’s failure to abide by the 
provisional measures, it noted that an order for provisional remedies only created 
procedural rights during the arbitration and could not be assimilated to a court’s 
decision to annul a final award (such as it was in the case of Saipem v. Bangladesh).37 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Party of the ICC's Commission on International Arbitration”, 2 ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin (1990) pp. 26-30. 
35 Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, ‘’ The Relationship Between Interim and Final Awards - 
Res Judicata Concerns’’, p. 247 
36 Tethyan Copper Company v. Pakistan (ICSID Case No.ARB/12/1), Decision on 
Provisional Measures, 13 December 2012, para.118. 
37 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5), 
Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012, para. 481. 
       Current  Problems  and  Recent  Developments  in  Investment  Arbitration                 xxvi  
  
G.The role of previous decisions in investment arbitration procedure 
 
Drawing and reliance on the experience of past decisions plays an important role in 
securing the uniformity and stability of law, especially in investment arbitration where 
the need for a coherent case-law is evident. Because of the public interests that stake 
in such cases, through a coherent case-law the predictability of decisions is 
strengthened and their authority is enhanced. 
 
In fact, tribunals in investment disputes, including ICSID tribunals, rely on previous 
decisions of other tribunals whenever they can. At the same time, it is also well 
established that the doctrine of precedent, as known in the common law, doesn’t apply 
in international adjudication.38 Therefore, prior decisions may not be binding, but 
‘’persuasive’’ authorities to be relied upon. In other words, tribunals in investment 
arbitrations are not bound by previous decisions of other tribunals, but each tribunal is 
constituted ad hoc for any particular case· so they cannot be expected to act like 
national courts. 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) under the 
‘’Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’’ of 28-29 May 
2013, mentioned the matter of the previous decisions in investment arbitration 
concluding on the same results. 39 
 
It would be useful to be written down some examples according to this above 
mentioned conference, which lead to the non-binding power of prior decisions 
towards the tribunals. The tribunal in Renta v. Russia case held that it 
was not bound by either RosInvest v. Russia (treaty arbitration) or Yukos v. Russia 
(ECHR case), which related to the same facts but were brought under different legal 
instruments. At the same time, it noted that “the lengthy texts of those decisions go 
over much of the same ground that has been covered in this case, and it is natural to 
                                                                                                                          
38  See Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
39 ‘’Recent developments in Investor-State dispute settlement, UNCTAD, 28-29 May 
2013, page 21 
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examine them in the light of many of the arguments made here as well.”40 In Bosh 
International v. Ukraine, the tribunal stated that while it did not consider itself bound 
by past decisions of other arbitral tribunals, it recognized that it should pay due regard 
to their conclusions. It also reiterated the view that in the absence of 
compelling reasons to the contrary, tribunals ought to follow solutions established in a 
series of consistent cases, comparable to the case at hand.41 
 
Similarly, in Letco v. Liberia case, the tribunal before quoting authority from other 
ICSID tribunals, stated: ‘’Although the tribunal is not bound by the precedents 
established by other ICSID tribunals, it is nonetheless instructive to consider their 
interpretations…’’42 
 
In addition to these cases, the tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh stated: 
 
‘’ The tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, 
it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of 
international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has 
a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes 
that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual 
case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment 
law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards certainty of the rule of law’’.43 
                                                                                                                          
40 Renta 4 S.V.S.A., et al v. The Russian Federation (SCC No. 24/2007), Award, 20 
July 2012, para. 24. The tribunal noted further: “The arbitrators understand that the 
same arguments may be affected not only by differences in the norms articulated in 
the relevant legal texts, but also by the pleadings and evidence put forward in support 
of those arguments. Bearing in mind all of these qualifications, the present Tribunal 
will nevertheless pay respectful heed to the analysis and conclusions of the 
distinguished arbitrators and judges in these two cases. Indeed they must do so, as 
both sides in this case have made submissions as to their implications and relative 
persuasiveness.” 
41 Bosh International, Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11), Award, 25 October 2012, para. 211, referring to 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v Pakistan (ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/19), Award, 27 August 2009, para. 145. 
42 Letco v. Liberia,award, 31 March 1986, ICSID Reports, 352 
43 Saipem v. Bangladesh, decision on jurisdiction, 21 March 2007, para.67. See also 
Noble Energy v. Ecuador, decision on jurisdiction, 5 March 2008, para.50 
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The importance of mentioning this matter in relevance with the investment’s 
arbitration recent developments is the difference that exists between commercial 
arbitration and investment arbitration mechanism. On the one hand, arbitral resolution 
of international commercial disputes concern the most diverse cases under diverse 
geographic and trade contest, involving the application of a variety of national laws, 
international principles and usages. Not to speak of the absence of comprehensive 
information on awards being rendered that renders recourse to precedent problematic 
It is not self evident that previous decisions should be considered in later cases. This 
is so for sure when the same principles and rules, typically meant to govern 
international commercial, are applicable, such as the UNIDROIT Principles or the 
Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Good. On the other hand, 
international investment law is instead a defined sector of international or rather 
transnational relations where efforts of harmonization and coherence through 
consistent jurisprudence is a valuable objective for the security of legal relations, 
notwithstanding the differences as to applicable treaties in individual cases.44 This is 
why, in investment arbitration is recommendable previous decisions to be taken into 
account by the arbitrators in order to guarantee the stability and predictability of the 
law. 
 
 
H.The discussion on an appeals mechanism in investment arbitration 
 
One of the advantages that investment arbitration mechanism offers to the foreign 
investors is that investor-State disputes are resolved by means of mechanisms 
governed by international standards and procedures and are not based on standards of 
the host State and the domestic courts. The finality of arbitration proceedings, as an 
arbitration award is binding and not subject to appeal on the merits, has generally 
been seen as an advantage over judicial settlement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
44 Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘’Precedent in the Settlement of International Economic 
Disputes: the WTO and Investment Arbitration models’’, Social Science Research 
Network, page 16 
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However, although finality is considered as one of the main advantages 
of international arbitration, for the savings it brings in costs and time, it is possible 
this finality to lead to inconsistent awards on the same or very similar questions or 
facts. That’s why there have been made many discussion on the possibility of an 
appeal mechanism after an investment dispute has been resolved by a tribunal, in 
order same or similar facts to be examined for a second time. These discussions 
started among scholars at the early 90s 45while the first discussion at the governmental 
level took place during the MAI negotiations.46 
 
There has been a long discussion among the legal community over the advantages and 
disadvantages of an appellate mechanism. This appellate mechanism has to be 
distinguished from the annulment mechanism under the ICSID Convention (article 
52). 
 
i) Advantages. The main advantages put forward in discussions were consistency and 
coherence of the decisions, the possibility of rectification of legal errors and, possibly 
serious errors of fact, the fact that the review would be confined to a neutral tribunal 
instead of national courts and that it would enhance effective enforcement. 
 
                                                                                                                          
45 See E. Lauterpacht, “Aspects of the Administration of International Justice” 1991. 
S. Schwebel “The Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral 
Awards”, in The Internationalisation of International Arbitration, Hunter, M., Mariott, 
A.,Veeder,, 115 (1995). 
46 At a High Level Meeting in February 1998, one delegation proposed the 
establishment of an appeal mechanism in the MAI for both State-State and 
investor-State dispute settlement. In informal consultations, delegations broadly 
agreed with the objectives of ensuring the development of a coherent 
jurisprudence and permitting an appeal where there may have been an error in 
law – particularly concerning the interpretation of MAI obligations. However, 
concerns were expressed about the delays and costs that might be engendered 
by adding an appeal and departing for investor-State arbitration from the 
traditional philosophy of fast, inexpensive and final one step arbitration. As an 
alternative, it was proposed and accepted that the MAI dispute settlement 
mechanism would initially remain drafted as final and binding, but it would be 
made subject to review of practical experience in five years from signature of the 
MAI. If, as a result of that review, the Contracting Parties considered it advisable 
to introduce an appeals body, this could be done by amending the Agreement. 
“Selected Issues on Dispute Settlement” (Note by the Chairman) DAFFE/MAI(98)12, 
13 March 1998. 
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ii) Disadvantages. The main disadvantages discussed were that an appeal mechanism 
would go against the principle of finality, would bring additional delays, costs and 
caseload and lead to the politicization of the system.47 
 
Although there are many disadvantages a number of arguments have been advanced 
about the benefits that investors could draw from the creation of an appeals 
mechanism. First, statistically investors lose at least as often as governments, so they 
would have at least the same opportunity to appeal. Second, the posting of a bond 
would provide a security for the investor of the amount of the award rendered, which 
can be of particular significance for non-ICSID arbitration.  
 
Up to now, the review of the advantages and disadvantages produced no consensus on 
the merits of adding an appeal to the investor-state dispute settlement system. With 
regards to the ICSID proposal upon this matter, the Administrative Council expressed 
the view that it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism, 
particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised. The ICSID 
Secretariat, will continue however to study such issues to assist member countries 
when and if it is decided to proceed towards the establishment of an ICSID appeal 
mechanism.48 
 
In conclusion, it is necessary to say that the need to place ‘’consistency and 
coherence’’ as the basis for an appellate system needs to be considered with some 
degree of caution. One should not put it on such a high pedestal as other objectives-
particularly the development objective. From a development perspective, until there is 
agreement on a multilateral investment agreement, a treaty-specific appeal system is 
better. A principal concern about the efforts to introduce a non-ring-fenced appellate 
system in the investment sphere is that it seeks to add to the coherence and 
                                                                                                                          
47Catherine Yannaca-Small, Legal Advisor in the Investment Division, OECD 
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ‘’ Improving the System of Investor-
state Dispute Settlement: An Overview’’, pages 192-194 
48 See “Suggested changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations”, p. 4, Working Paper 
of the ICSID Secretariat, May 12, 2005 
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development of international investment law through a somewhat circuitous non-
transparent route.49 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion and in order to end my thesis stating as many recent sources as possible, 
i will be based on the recent UNCTAD Conference of the 26ht June of 2013.As a 
principal matter there will be analyzed a few concerns about the whole mechanism 
and more specifically: 1) Concerns about the Legitimacy and Transparency of the 
decisions, 2) Concerns about arbitrator’s independence and impartiality and 3) 
Concerns regarding the costs and time-intensity of arbitrations.( see A) In a second 
step, some proposals for improvement of the ISDS mechanism will follow (see B) and 
in the end the concluding remarks will be stated. ( see C) 
 
 
A) 
 
After having mentioned few of the current problems and recent developments in 
investment arbitration, it would be useful to mention some useful proposals for reform 
of Investor-State dispute settlement as were updated in the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development on the 26th of June 2013. However, firstly it is necessary 
to mention some of the expressed concerns about the whole mechanism. 
 
Starting with the purpose of the establishment of the Investor-State Dispute   
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, it is to be said that it was designed for depoliticizing 
investment disputes and creating a forum that would offer investors a fair hearing 
before an independent, neutral and qualified tribunal.50 The rendering of final and 
enforceable decisions in a flexible way was an attraction for the parties. The fact that 
the disputes would be taken out of the domestic sphere of the State, equipped the 
                                                                                                                          
49 Karl P. Sauvant, ‘’Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes’’, 
Oxford University Press, p. 278 
50‘’Reforms of Investor-State dispute settlement: in search of a roadmap ,UNCTAD, 
26 June 2013, p. 2 
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investors with an important guarantee that their claims will be adjudicated in an 
independent and impartial manner. However, the actual functioning of ISDS under 
investment treaties has led to concerns about systemic deficiencies in the regime51, 
which will be analyzed in the text. 
 
1) Concerns about the Legitimacy and Transparency of the decisions 
 
Initially and concerning the legitimacy and transparency of the decisions, it is true that 
in many cases foreign investors have made ISDS claims to challenge measures 
adopted by States in the public interest, like policies to promote social equity, foster 
environmental protection or protect public health). At this point, it is doubtful whether 
three individual arbitrators have the sufficient legitimacy to assess the validity of 
States acts, especially concerning sensitive public policy issues. In addition, even 
though the transparency of the system has improved since the early 2000s52 ISDS 
proceedings can still be kept fully confidential if both disputing parties so wish even 
in cases where the dispute involves matters of public interest.53 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
51 Michael Waibel et al. (eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: 
Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010), D. Gaukrodger and K. 
Gordon, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment 
Policy Community”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3; 
P. Eberhardt and C. Olivet, “Profiting from Injustice: How Law  
Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom” 
(Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute, 2012) 
 
52 See for example, the 2006 amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the 
2013 agreement reached by an UNCITRAL Working Group regarding transparency in 
ISDS proceedings. In the case of UNCITRAL, the new rules have a limited effect in 
that they are designed to apply not to all future arbitrations but only to arbitrations 
under future IIAs. 
53 This applies to cases brought under arbitration rules other than ICSID (only ICSID 
keeps a public registry of arbitrations). It is indicative that of the 85 cases under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), only 18 were public (as of end 2012). Source: the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration International Bureau. See further UNCTAD, Transparency: A Sequel, 
Series on Issues in IIAs II (New York and Geneva, 2012) 
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2) Concerns about arbitrator’s independence and impartiality 
 
It is a well-known and one of the most important principles of arbitration that 
arbitrators must be independent and impartial concerning the parties, their counsel and 
the subject matter of the dispute. Among others, Article 14(1) of the Arbitration Rules 
of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the “SCC 
Rules”) expressly provides that arbitrators “must be impartial and independent”. 
  
In the context of international arbitration, the concept of independence is related to the 
personal connection or relationship between the arbitrator and the parties or their 
counsel personal social and financial. This is considered to be an objective test, 
mainly because it has nothing to do with an arbitrator’s state of mind. 
 
Unlike independence, the concept of “partiality” is more abstract being a state of mind 
that only can be proved through facts. Impartiality is the absence of any bias in the 
mind of the arbitrator towards a party or the matter in dispute. It is connected with 
actual or apparent bias of an arbitrator, either in favor of one of the parties or in 
relation to the issues in dispute. Impartiality is thus a subjective and more abstract 
concept than independence that primarily involves a state of mind. 
 
Nowadays, an increasing number of challenges to arbitrators lead to the result that 
they are perceived as biased or predisposed. On the one hand, the disputing parties 
tend to appoint individuals sympathetic to their case and on the other hand, arbitrators 
play the game of “changing of hats” (meaning that they serve as arbitrators in some 
cases and counsel in others), facts that amplify these concerns.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
54 For further details, see Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012 : 43-51) 
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3) Concerns regarding the costs and time-intensity of arbitrations 
 
According to the official web page of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
‘’Arbitration can be faster and less expensive than litigation in the courts. Experienced 
arbitrators have developed expertise in designing procedures that maximize time and 
costs efficiency and thereby minimize the disruption to the ordinary business of 
parties involved in arbitration proceedings. That said, a complex international dispute 
can take a great deal of time and money to resolve, even by arbitration. Even in such 
cases, the limited scope for challenging arbitral awards, as compared with court 
judgments, offers a clear advantage in terms of limiting time and costs. The finality of 
arbitration ensures that the parties should not be entangled in a prolonged and costly 
series of appeals’’.55 
 
However, arbitration practice in general and more specifically ISDS practice has 
proved that arbitration might not represent a speedy and low-cost method of dispute 
resolution. On average, costs, including legal fees (which on average amount to 
approximately 82% of total costs) and tribunal expenses, have exceeded $8 million 
per party per case. These costs are a significant burden on public finances, but also on 
investors, especially those with limited resources.  
.  
Large law firms, who dominate the field, tend to mobilize a team of attorneys for 
each case who charge high rates and apart from this, taking into account the fact that 
many legal issues remain unsettled contributes to the need to investigate and study 
many previous arbitral awards. All these factors are responsible for the high costs and 
the long duration of arbitrations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
55 http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/ (ten 
good reasons to choose ICC Arbitration) 
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B) 
 
Proposals for improvement of the ISDS mechanism 
 
All these concerns indicate the need to reform and reshape the mechanism in order the 
whole procedure to get improved and the results to be the prospective ones. 
According to the UNCTAD conclusions concerning the reform of Investor-State 
dispute settlement there are five broad paths for reform and these are: 
 
 1. Promoting alternative dispute resolution 
 2. Tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs 
 3. Limiting investor access to ISDS 
 4. Introducing an appeals facility 
 5. Creating a standing international investment court56 
 
Although all of them are really important for the improvement of the mechanism, they 
won’t be analyzed in depth· this is because the meaning of these references is to be 
proposed some potential solutions regarding the investment arbitration evolution and 
which can be connected to the already First of all, a tailoring of the existing system 
would include changes that could lead to a more sufficient result. These changes 
could lead to an imposition of time limits for bringing claims, to an increase of the 
contracting parties’ role in interpreting the treaty in order to be avoided legal 
interpretations that go against their intentions· could also lead to the establishment of 
a mechanism for consolidation of related claims, something that would be efficient 
regarding the safeguard of the consistency of awards and the reduction of the costs of 
the proceedings. 
 
According to the UNCTAD conclusions, providing also more transparency in ISDS 
and introducing an appeals facility would also be reform ways for the improvement of 
the mechanism. These subjects have already been analyzed above and balancing the 
pros and cons of the adoption or not of these amendments someone can assume them 
as useful or not. Concerning the appeal mechanism and as a supplementary comment, 
                                                                                                                          
56 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf, p. 4 
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among the pros of this mechanism, is that 57an appeals mechanism it is potential to 
secure consistent and balanced opinions, which could rectify the legitimacy concerns 
about the current ISDS regime.  
 
 
 
C) 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Taking into account the numerous challenges arising from the current ISDS regime 
and the various legitimacy concerns about the international investment arbitration it is 
advisable States to decide jointly which solutions would be the appropriate ones. The 
fact that ISDS system is a system of application of law means that firstly or in parallel 
must be achieved the development of substantive international investment law. 
However, investment arbitration will probably remain the most important modus of 
dispute settlement between host States and foreign investors and for this reason all 
proposals for its improvement have to be noted, at a first step by all scholars and 
practitioners that confront with its shortages and its legal gaps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
57 An alternative solution would be a system of preliminary rulings, whereby tribunals 
in ongoing proceedings would be enabled or required to refer unclear questions of law 
to a certain central body.  
 This option, even though it does not grant a right of appeal, may help improve 
consistency in arbitral decision making. See e.g., C. Schreuer, “Preliminary Rulings in 
Investment Arbitration”, in K. Sauvant , Appeals Mechanism in International 
Investment Disputes (OUP, 2008). 
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